Query: what have the “high-level” people at “MassDOT” been doing all this time?  And why weren’t they involved in this particular study which was initiated by no less than his Excellency the Governor.

Overall, the report was a disappointing exercise in stating the obvious as if it was being noticed for the first time.  Proverbially, lots of trees and very little forest.  But then again perhaps that is all that could be expected from four lower-level “authors/researchers” in a short sixty-day window of time.

I would have been pleased to have seen some more comprehensive thought about what ought to be, both in terms of services and finances.  Is Boston receiving the transit services that it needs?  Practically speaking, how can services be maintained or improved while cutting costs?  Where are the inefficiencies?  The report did not make even a baby step in that direction.  It defies credulity that all the low-hanging fruit really was picked.

What about removing door-openers on the Red Line?  If the MBTA was in such dire shape, why all the excess attention to prettying stations and broken air conditioning units in the past few years?  Was the Silver Line tunnel-to-nowhere at South Station the massive costly mistake that it appears?  What would be the cost savings from standardizing all of the multiple vehicles from the Green, Orange, Blue, and Red lines (all of which are different)?

As for financing, the solution seems obvious and perhaps it already is being implemented.  The MBTA simply should operate transit services, and those services should be near-fully funded by fares.  If a bus costs $3 to operate, riders should pay.  On the other hand, infrastructure should be 100% funded and maintained by other sources and those projects and monies should be outside the direct control of the MBTA.  That appears to be at least part of the theory of the recent reform legislation that created MassDOT.  The challenge, of course, would be in the details.

The content of the report was unimpressive … but the format and web site sure were snappy!

Looks like history is repeating … or at least rhyming.  Gov. Patrick directed that the proposed 2009 hike is off the table, for now.  Hopefully major service cuts also were averted.  If the consensus economic view is correct that inflation will remain subdued for some time — and assuming the inflation-adjusted fare of $1.75 remains the third-rail of subway pricing — that proposed hike won’t be finding its way to riders anytime soon.

In 2005, Grabauskas took the job of general manager with a clear vision.  The T would treat riders like customers; the system would be reliable, clean, courteous, and safe.  But mainly clean.  And accessible; inaccessibility “impacts not only on the disabled, but on parents with children in strollers, as well.” Grabauskas professed to be a neatnik; he was particularly concerned about the condition of elevators and escalators.  He apparently believed that if he made the T a comfortable place to be, riders would flock and revenues would soar.  And, of course, he wanted to control costs.

So four years later, how did he do?

Grabauskas never shrunk from the gaze of his “customers,” for example writing a regular Q+A column in the free daily paper Metro, and appearing more than once on WBUR public radio.  He was determined to keep riders safe; he initiated random, highly visible police screening checkpoints.  He committed to spending hundreds of millions of dollars to make the T more accessible, installing announcement screens and elevated platforms on the Green Line.  He resisted union contract demands and agreed to wage increases only after being overruled by a labor arbitrator.  The T renovated the Charles Street station and installed a new train control system on the Red Line that permitted more frequent service.  And there is the electronic fare system.

The list goes on.  Grabauskas was nothing if not engaged in the goings-on at the T.  Perhaps one can disagree with him on policy matters — for example it might be reasonable to question the wisdom of a having a broke organization with heavy capital needs spend hundreds of millions of dollars in an effort to meet the unique requirements of less than 0.1% of T riders — but the man demonstrated integrity and dedication to his “customers.”

But many things never changed.  Yes, the trains still are slow and late.  Yes, the escalators have at times been scandalously unreliable.  Yes there still are door-openers on the  Red, Green, and Orange Lines.  Yes, Kenmore Station still is under construction nearly five years later.  No, Dan Grabauskas does not commute to work on the T.  Yes, the T still is broke.

No Cell Zone

But none of those were the reasons that Governor Patrick and his appointees gave for the reasons they had lost faith in Grabauskas.  The breakdown occurred, they said, because two Green Line drivers in two years apparently had ignored traffic signals for different reasons, and Grabauskas was not in Washington, D. C. when the NTSB released its report on one of the accidents.  And there was a power outage on the Green Line.  That’s it.  Never mind that Grabauskas nearly overmanaged the aftermath of the Government Center Green Line collision by banning cell phones from drivers.  And never mind that he was on an unpaid budget-related furlough at the time the NTSB report was released.  And never mind he is not the T electrician.

No matter; Grabauskas is out, but to Gov. Patrick’s likely chagrin, the former T general manager emerges from the tussle virtually unscathed.  That isn’t true for the Governor and his appointees.  The termination looks like short-term political retribution — at taxpayers’ expense.

Unfortunately, the real loser here looks to be the T.  The authority is leaderless at a critical time where the patchwork of agencies is being reexamined and when the modes of transportation finance are in flux in a way they have not been in memory.  The Governor has made noises time and again that he is a friend to transit.  Now he has an opportunity to go from words to action.

The Legislature was wise to insist that bicyclists err on the side of safety and caution.  Someone on the road has to, and it probably won’t be automobile drivers, chatting on cell phones and shuffling through the songs on i-pods.

Traffic Sensor Doesn't Notice Bikes

So here’s a question:  what is a bicyclist lawfully required to do when the light never turns green?  It’s a frequent problem.  Modern traffic lights (i.e. the ones used everywhere except the city of Boston) are triggered by sensors that detect automobiles.  Roll over the sensor in a Chevy, and the light turns green.  Roll over the sensor on a Raleigh bicycle and … the light stays red.  It never turns green.  Ever.  Roll back and forth on it.  Jump up and down.  Nothing.

The question is sort of academic; the obvious answer is that you treat the traffic signal an ornament with little relevance to a bicyclist … but still you do so at your own risk — risk of physical injury and risk of legal jeopardy.  Injury because the lights are most frequently used at the most dangerous intersections.  There is a chance that the ornament will be you.  Jeopardy because who is to say the law enforcement officer will agree with your choice.  And it takes some significant waiting and experimenting to be sure the sensor really doesn’t work; that’s not a small inconvenience with traffic lights every few blocks.

I wish I had the answer.  It’s unfortunate, but perhaps the only safe thing to do is to drive.

Kudos to Luke Bornheimer and the “Put the MBTA on Google Maps” Facebook group for influencing the T and Google to make this happen.

[eds. note:  After this was posted, Google adjusted the way that it selects routes; the original post contained another link that now is outdated]

The criminal charge apparently stems from a Massachusetts law that applies to a “railroad or railway of the class usually operated by steam power.”  One probably can’t begrudge the District Attorney for not knowing the precise history of the Green Line and the Scollay Square trolley stop; that history never involved steam.

But it certainly would be interesting if the railroad law applied on the Green Line.  The law has some interesting, specific requirements.  A few things would need to change.  To be a trolley conductor, Quinn would have needed to serve as a “brakeman” for two years.  Not a bad idea … except trolleys only have one driver (and a door-operator) and no brakeman.  Any trolley conductor who never worked as a “brakeman” (probably all of them) would be subject to a $500 fine and year imprisonment.  (There’s no such thing as a railroad “operator”)  Bare-headed Green Line employees also would be no more; all railroad employees must don a “cap.” An employee without a “cap” forfeits $45.

But on the other hand, maybe some changes would make some sense.  If the Green Line was a railroad then it would be required to accept bicycles, one per rider.  Of course, as I’ve written previously, the Green Line irrationally prohibits bicycles under all circumstances. And don’t try to hold the door to keep the Green Line train from leaving the station; if it’s a railroad that offense carries up to a $1,000 fine and 20 years in prison, which makes what Quinn is facing look like tiddly-winks.

Obviously the Green Line isn’t run like a railroad.  There is a reason for that; it’s a street railway, apparently subject to an entirely different law.  That law doesn’t require employees to wear caps, has no obvious requirements for the qualifications of conductors, and (unfortunately) doesn’t require that trolleys accommodate bicycles.  If you merely obstruct a trolley you only can be jailed for three months (instead of 20 years).

And if you drive a trolley at excessive speed like Quinn allegedly did — even willfully — you forfeit $500.  That might conceivably seem like a bit light of a maximum penalty.  But fear not; all operators of common carriers — from steamboats, to buses, to trolleys — also are subject to an entirely different law that the District Attorney apparently did not specifically name, which carries a penalty of two and a half years in jail for gross negligence in the control of any common carrier (not just a railroad).

What does all of this add up to?  Well, ultimately if the District Attorney succeeds in sending Quinn to prison for three years (instead of to jail for 2 1/2)  for crashing a railroad train (and not a trolley), then the T should get ready to welcome bicycles and their riders on that same line.  Because that’s the law!

In addition to the federal tax, many if not all states assess an additional local tax.  In Massachusetts, the state part of the tax is a 21-cent surcharge per gallon of gasoline.  But that method of calculation is new.  From as early as 1949, Massachusetts assessed the tax as a percentage of the cost of wholesale gasoline, rather than by the gallon.  As a result, the tax kept pace with inflation, unlike its federal counterpart.  The system worked because when prices increased with inflation, so too did the total tax collected.  The initial tax rate was 10%; in 1991 it increased to 19.1%.

Then in 2000 the Cellucci administration, in a moment of weakness, addressed rising gasoline prices by converting the flexible 19.1% tax into a flat 21-cent surcharge per gallon of gas.  It was an obscure change with dramatic results.  For the rest of the decade, the tax lagged significantly behind inflation and coffers ran dry of money that might have been used for transportation purposes.

If the gas tax today was calculated the same way as in 1999, the current rate for the gas tax would be about 30-cents per gallon.  That’s 9 cents per gallon more than the current tax.  (The official wholesale price of a gallon of gas was $1.57 in the last month for which the figures are available (April)).  But unfortunately the change was made in 2000 and we’re still suffering the impact; transportation revenues have not kept pace.

Recently, the Governor proposed a 19-cent increase in the gas tax, to 40 cents per gallon.  The Massachusetts Senate characteristically dismissed the idea of an increase saying the Legislature had voted against it.  The Governor and the Legislature obviously realize that the Commonwealth needs to raise more money to maintain the existing level of services.  Toll hikes and increases in the gas tax apparently have been ruled out.  Only an increase in the statewide sales tax– which doesn’t apply to gasoline– has been approved; one wonders about the equity of taxing everything except transportation to fund transportation needs.

So here’s a modest proposal.  Why not roll back the gas tax to 1999 levels … and once again calculate the tax as 19.1 percent of the wholesale price of gasoline (30-cents per gallon in April).  Throw out the flat tax of 21 cents per gallon.  The proposal would allow the Governor to raise additional transportation funding from a source other than general funds, and the Legislature credibly could claim that it acted responsibly to undo a heedless stealth tax cut that was implemented in the hazy days of 2000.  A functional 9-cent per gallon increase in the tax would fall roughly at the midpoint of the Governor’s proposal (19-cent increase) and the Legislature’s proposal to do nothing.  And the old method of computing the tax naturally keeps pace with inflation — meaning the tax won’t need to be revisited for some time.

So how about it?  Why not revert to a formula for the gas tax that served the Commonwealth well for about fifty years: switch back to calculating it by percentage of price, rather than per gallon.

The NTSB found that the crash probably occurred because the trolley operator didn’t stop at a red light on the tracks.  And the most likely reason the operator didn’t stop was because she didn’t see the red light.  And the most likely reason she didn’t see the red light was because she was asleep.  And the most likely reason she was asleep was because she had a hidden medical condition that deprived her of sleep.  Thus the most likely cause of that unfortunate collision was resolved as thoroughly as it probably ever will be.

But the NTSB made another interesting finding.  The red light was broken and stuck on red.  The signal was red all the time, even when it should have been yellow or another color.  Even more strange, the T did not know about the broken signal because “[MBTA] operating rules do not require that train operators report signals [erroneously] displaying red.”

Accidents happen, and everyone knows that the cash-strapped T relies on antiquated systems.  But what about “see something, say something?”  When passengers see something suspicious they are supposed to run breathless to a station attendant.  And when a conductor notices a piece of essential safety equipment is broken and out of service … silence?

What is really interesting about this is it also would put subway and bus fares at their highest levels in Boston ever, even after the prices are adjusted for local inflation.  In other words, the Boston subway never has been as costly to ride in real world terms as it will be if the fare increase is approved.

The Boston subway debuted with a nickel fare in 1897, and slowly the fare rose, to 10¢ in 1919, 15¢ in 1949, 25¢ in 1968,  75¢ in 1981, and 85¢ in 1991.  The MBTA Advisory Board published then-current figures in 2006 during the last round of fare increases.

T to Riders: How High is Too High?

In 1897, a nickel bought more than it does today.  A lot more.  According to the Bureau of Labor statistics, a nickel then had 96% more value in Boston than a nickel today.  If you adjust the value of the nickel (or quarter) for the additional buying power in had in the past, you get a chart like the one on the right (which shows fares in constant dollars since 1945).

The actual value of the nickel fare in 1897 was $1.35 in today’s dollars, which is inexpensive but not so much of a steal.  The standard fare right now is $1.70.  In the Boston subway’s 112-year history, the standard fare been higher than it is right now in constant dollars just three times: in 1933 ($1.71), 1954 ($1.77), and in 1981 ($1.90).  And for 28-years, the 1981 peak has stood as a high-water mark for the regular subway fare (in constant dollars).  If the T gets its way and promptly implements the fare hike, it will set a new record for unaffordability, although because exit fares recently were eliminated the burden will fall disproportionately on innercity riders who do not exit at suburban stops where previously there were surcharges.

What is even more interesting is that the T is raising fares just as prices for private transportation are falling.  Or at least not rising to the same extent.  The chart shows dotted lines for private transportation costs in Boston and nationwide for public transit costs (also from the Bureau of Labor Statistics), both of which have continued to decline relative to background inflation as the T dramatically raised its fares.  (note: for purposes of the graph, private transportation costs were equalized to subway fares for the year 2000; the trend of costs upward or downward is what is significant)  For fifty years, changes in regular T fares corresponded roughly to changes in private transportation costs (both in direction and magnitude), but in the last ten years private costs have been flat whereas standard subway fares soared.  I’m no economist, but it seems like the T should be able to keep its customers’ costs flat.  Instead the T simply failed to hold the line.

Riders still can take heart from a historical perspective.  Each of the previous real dollar fare-price records were short-lived.  In 1981 and 1954, the fare increases were almost immediately rescinded.  The next year fares were cut– an unusual occurrence– by 20% and 25% respectively.  In 1982, for example, the Legislature restored funding that the T lost the previous year.  And in 1934, a bout of deflation that caused the rise in the real fare price was broken and the real fare price in constant dollars declined (even though the stated fare was unchanged).

The rate hike proposal probably isn’t the best option.  Probably a fairer solution (pun alert) would be to restore some rationality to the subway fare structure by reintroducing some form of distance pricing.  Functionally the T is closer to that goal because it has introduced an electronic fare system, but distance pricing would require a revival of exit fares.  And Charlie got stuck on the subway as a result of exit fares.  No one wants Charlie to get stuck again.  A 60-year-old ditty still drives policy in some quarters.  More on distance pricing another time.

Although the fare hike may possibly be a fait accompli, the T scheduled “workshops” for riders to speak out about it.  I expect they should get an earful.  Not for nothing, the first session is scheduled to be conducted in the State House,  Gardner Auditorium, on  Monday, August 10, from 4pm to 7pm.  Probably the T hopes someone there will be listening.

Whatever decision the state makes, it will be a painful one.  But on the other hand, history tells us that $2.00 to ride the Boston subway — even for just one stop — is just too high a price.

Stuck in Newton on the way to the ballpark

In a minature version of the Easter 2009 turnpike toll fiasco, insufficient staffing at the Riverside Green line terminal in Newton at noon on Sunday jammed traffic all the way back onto I-95/Route 128.  Red Sox faithful arrived at the station early for the 1:35pm afternoon start … and most still needed all of the time and patience they could muster.

Near Capacity Lot a Surprise for a Sunday

Turnout was strong for the short trolley ride to the stadium.  With the reduction in trolley fares inbound from the station a few years ago (from $3 per person to $1.70), families west of Boston seem to know a good deal when they see one.

Too bad the T and its contractor, Central Parking, didn’t get it right today, and they left T patrons idling in traffic for probably forty-five minutes each — right outside of the station.

Traffic backed up to highway overpass

The problem: Riverside station has staffed booths at the entrance to the parking lot, and in their wisdom, Central Parking and the T sent just one attendant to staff the collection booth for the entire thousand-space lot.  For occasional parkers, like weekend Red Sox fans, paying for parking is not a speedy proposition.  So the influx of fans piled up at the booth near the back of the station.  And then the line backed up through the station (blocking bus access). And then the line jammed up the local street outside.  And then it jammed up the Route 95/128 overpass, going so far as to stop traffic, bumper to bumper on the Route 95/128 off-ramp.

Transit-jam on highway off-ramp

I doubt many of those fans are feeling very smart now about their decision to ride the T.  A half-hour trip to the Sunday game turned into a two-hour nightmare.  It’s unfortunate that the T and Central Parking can’t figure out a way to collect weekend parking fees in an effective way.

Riverside Station entrance

When the Turnpike inexplicably jammed patrons earlier this year by understaffing collection booths, the head of the organization promptly resigned.  Although this jam was no less inexcusable, don’t expect the same thing from the T.  In some ways it seems to set the bar lower.  But at Central Parking on the other hand … there may be some anxious days ahead.

(eds. note: Red Sox game coincided with final day of the Tall Ships Festival)